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THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE: A NEW 
WEAPON TO CHALLENGE THE OIL 
POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 
ALISON C. CARRIGAN* 
Abstract: SeaRiver Maritime, Exxon Oil Company's United States 
shipping subsidiary, recently challenged section 5007 of the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990 as a bill of attainder. SeaRiver Maritime is the 
owner and operator of the former Exxon Valdez, which was renamed 
the SeaRiver Mediterranean following the Valdez's infamous spill in 
Alaska's Prince William Sound in 1989. SeaRiver Maritime argued that 
section 5007, which prohibits any vessel that has spilled more than one 
million gallons of oil into the marine environment from ever re-
entering Prince William Sound, is an unconstitutional legislative 
punishment, and that this portion of the Oil Pollution Act was meant to 
apply only to the SeaRiver Mediterranean. This Comment examines the 
Oil Pollution Act's primary provisions and the Act's Prince William 
Sound provisions, which include section 5007. Further, this Comment 
explains the reasons for the constitutional prohibition on bills of 
attainder and the modern analysis to which courts subject legislation 
challenged under the Bill of Attainder Clause. Finally, this Comment 
argues that SeaRiver Maritime's claim fails both prongs of the Supreme 
Court's bill of attainder analysis and that section 5007 is legal and valid 
as enacted. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress passed the Oil Pollution Act (OPA).l OPA con-
solidated the various existing federal liability provisions into one stat-
ute, providing cleanup authority, penalties, and a liability scheme for 
oil pollution.2 The statute resulted from a fifteen-year effort to enact 
comprehensive oil pollution legislation and response to a number of 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTALAF'FAIRS LAw REVIEW, 2000-01. 
I Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 V.S.C. §§ 2701-2761,26 U.S.C. §§ 4611,9509 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101-380,104 Stat. 484. 
2 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731. 
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oil spills in 1989 and 1990, including the infamous Exxon Valdez oil 
spill. 3 
In addition to the enactment of OPA, the F;xxon Valdez oil spill 
had other significant legal impacts. Exxon Corporation, Alaska, and 
the United States entered into a $1 billion settlement to dismiss all 
civil and criminal claims surrounding the spill.4 While this consent 
decree should have ended the litigation between the parties, Exxon's 
shipping subsidiary has recently brought claims in federal district 
courts, alleging in part, that section 5007 of OPA, is an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder.5 
This question is an interesting one, since the protection from 
bills of attainder is found in the text of the Constitution and offers a 
potentially powerful means of protecting individual rights against ar-
bitrary or punitive legislative action.6 Bills of attainder have been 
found in laws that prevented Communists from being part of labor 
unions' and in statutes that specifically mentioned individuals as sub-
versive and unfit to work for the federal government.s The United 
States Supreme Court's most comprehensive articulation of its test for 
bills of attainder is set out in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.9 
According to that test, when a law is challenged as a bill of attainder, it 
is subjected to a two-part inquiry, examining the law for both 
specificity and punishment.10 Since Nixon, courts have expanded 
upon the punishment prong of the analysis so that if a law has a le-
gitimate nonpunitive purpose, it can survive a bill of attainder chal-
lenge.ll The importance ofthis element has gained a firm foothold in 
the federal circuit courts, where the weapons and telecommunica-
tions industries have challenged laws as violations of the Bill of At-
3 Russell V. Randle, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Its Provisions, Intent, and Effects, 21 
ENVTL. L. REp. 10,119,10,119 (1991). 
4 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp.9, 9 (D. D.C. 1997) 
[hereinafter SeaRiver Ill. 
5 See id. at 10. 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, d. 3; Jane Welsh, Note, The Bill of Attainder Clause: An Un-
qualified Guarantee of Due Process, 50 BROOK. L. REv. 77,81 (1983). 
7 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965). 
8 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303,314-15 (1946). 
9433 U.S. 425, 471-73 (1977). 
10 See id.; see also SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 154 
F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1113 (1999). 
11 See, e.g., Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1994). 
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tainder Clause.I2 As a result, legislation so specific that it names com-
panies and imposes a legislative burden on them can still stand on the 
basis that it also furthers what the court perceives to be a nonpunitive 
legislative purpose.I3 
SeaRiver Maritime Financial Holdings (SeaRiver Maritime), 
Exxon's U.S. shipping subsidiary, has made a bill of attainder chal-
lenge to section 5007 of OPA, which prevents any vessel that has 
spilled more than one million gallons of oil into the marine environ-
ment from ever re-entering Prince William Sound, Alaska.14 Given 
that OPA's overall purpose is to set up a statutory scheme that reduces 
the likelihood of future oil spills and to create a liability structure that 
ensures that spillers will fully compensate those affected by oil spills, 
the challenge has little chance of success. I5 While SeaRiver Maritime's 
specific bill of attainder challenge is not presently before any tribu-
nal,I6 its claims bear discussion. This Comment argues that SeaRiver 
Maritime's claim fails both prongs of the Supreme Court's bill of at-
tainder analysis and that section 5007 should be upheld. 
Section I recounts the causes of the Exxon Valdez spill and the im-
pacts of its aftermath on the environment. Section II discusses how 
the primary provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 drastically 
changed the landscape for oil pollution prevention, cleanup, and li-
ability. Further, this Section outlines OPA's Prince William Sound pro-
visions, remedies directed specifically to the region most dramatically 
affected by the Exxon Valdez spill. Section III details the litigation sur-
rounding the spill, focusing closely on the recent legal battles be-
tween the United States government and SeaRiver Maritime, an 
Exxon shipping subsidiary. Section IV explains the reasons for the 
constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder and the modern analy-
sis to which courts subject legislation challenged under the Bill of At-
tainder Clause. Section V suggests the result to be reached should a 
12 See grnerally Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999) petition for 
cert.filed, 68 U.S.L.w. 3742 (U.S. May 23, 2000) (No. 99-1874); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal 
Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) [hereinafter BellSouth Ill. 
13 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066 n.1O & 1067; BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688. 
14 See 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. 
v. Pena, 952 F.2d 452, 456 & 459 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1996) [hereinafter SeaRiver 1]. 
15 See grnerally Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761, 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 
9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. 
16 SeeSeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d 756, 756 (D. Alaska 
1998) [hereinafter SeaRiver III]. The most recent round of litigation in the district of 
Alaska held that the 1991 consent decree settling all civil and criminal liability effectively 
bars SeaRiver Maritime's right to sue on this constitutional issue. See id. 
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court hear SeaRiver Maritime's attack on OPA as a violation of the Bill 
of Attainder Clause in the future. 
1. THE EXXON VALDEZ OIL SPILL 
The story of the Exxon Valdez begins in San Diego in 1986. Exxon 
Shipping Company commissioned the construction of the 987-foot 
tanker vessel specifically to transport crude oil from Alaska to 
refineries in the East Bay and in Southern California,17 The newest, 
best-equipped ship in Exxon's fleet was named for Valdez, Alaska, 
making it the pride of the town that sits at the end of the 800-mile 
Alaska oil pipeline. IS Three years later, on March 24, 1989, the pride 
of Valdez was transformed into shock as the nation witnessed the 
worst oil spill in United States history when the Valdez ran aground on 
Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound.I9 By the time it was over, the 
Exxon Valdez had spilled almost eleven million gallons of oil into the 
sea, creating a slick big enough to reach from Cape Cod to North 
Carolina.2o 
The nation's horror magnified as the truth about the events lead-
ing up to the oil spill came to light.21 The tanker had maneuvered 
around ice floes on auto-pilot, accelerating her speed as she moved 
out of her designated navigation route and into the in-bound ship-
ping lanes.22 Furthermore, Captain Joseph Hazelwood had been 
drinking within two hours of the Valdez's departure,23 a violation of 
Coast Guard regulations prohibiting officers from drinking alcohol 
17 Glen Martin, Valdez Spill Leaves Bitter Residue: Oil is Gone after 10 Years, but Ecological, 
Economic Fallout Continues, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 24, 1999, at AI; Thomas Kupper, lWlere Are 
They Now: Ex-Exxon Valdez Eyes Alaska, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Mar. 15, 1999, at B2. 
18 See ART DAVIDSON, IN THE WAKE OF THE EXXON VALDEZ 5 (1990); For Now, At Least, 
Infamous Ship is BanishedfromAlaska, MILWAUKEE]' SENTINEL, Mar. 23, 1999, at 5. 
19 Scott Allen, Deep Problems 10 Years After Exxon Valdez: Worst Oil Spill in U.S. Has Linger-
ing Effects for Alaska, Industries, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1999, at AI. 
20 See id. 
21 See For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5. 
22 DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at 13-16. High speed and the use of auto-pilot are two 
conditions considered inappropriate for navigating in Prince William Sound. Speed was 
typically reduced when ice was encountered to minimize impact with icebergs and give the 
crew time to make adjustments. See id. Further, auto-pilot was almost never used in the 
sound, since Coast Guard regulations and Exxon policy dictated that it should only be 
used in the open sea. See Timothy Egan, Elements of Tanker Disaster: Drinking, Fatigue, Com-
placency, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,1989, at B7. 
23 See DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at 10. Hazelwood was later acquitted of operating the 
ship while drunk, but a civil jury eventually found him guilty of reckless behavior. See Carey 
Goldberg, A Tanker Hauling Memories is Shunned: Alaska Residents oppose Exxon s Efforts to 
Bring Back the Valdez, Mar. 16, 1997, at AI. 
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within four hours of embarking on ship.24 Hazelwood had also left 
third mate Gregory Cousins in charge of the bridge.25 Cousins was not 
only unqualified to operate the vessel on his own,26 but Coast Guard 
procedures also dictated that two officers be present on the bridge in 
dangerous conditions.2' The Exxon Valdez's twenty-member crew later 
testified that they were exhausted, having worked an average of 140 
hours of overtime a month per person.28 
To complicate matters, the response to the accident was simply 
too slow.29 In 1981, Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, a consortium 
of seven oil companies including Exxon, had dismissed its round-the-
clock emergency oil response team, leaving Valdez Harbor and Prince 
William Sound unprepared for oil spills.30 As a result, cleanup efforts 
were severely delayed, and the barge carrying 50,000 pounds of much-
needed cleanup equipment did not arrive at the accident scene until 
fourteen hours after the grounding.31 There was also confusion as to 
whether Exxon, the state of Alaska, or the federal government was to 
direct the cleanup; whether chemical dispersants could be used; and 
what steps were to be taken to stabilize and empty the remaining 
crude oil from the punctured vessel,32 As a result, Exxon squandered 
the calm seas and weather during the first two days following the spill, 
in which the oil could have been effectively encircled with booms and 
scooped up by skimmers.33 
The consequences of the accident were horrible, but perhaps 
even more tragic was the accident's preventable nature.34 The oil in 
24 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. 
25 See DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at 16-17. 
26 Id. Cousins did not have the necessary license to pilot the tanker in Prince William 
Sound. See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. The licensing is approved only after extensive expe-
rience in dangerous waters. See id. 
27 SeeDAvIDSON, supra note 18, at 16-17. 
26 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. Exhaustion from working overtime was a result of a 
downgrading in the number of crewmembers approved by the Coast Guard after oil com-
panies argued that the new technology of the Valdez and other tankers of its class did not 
need larger staffing. See id. The crew, consisting of a third fewer members than on older 
vessels by comparison, frequently went long stretches with little or no sleep. See id. 
29 See id. 
30 See Keith Schneider, Under Oil's Powerful SPel~ Alaska Was Off Guard, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
2, 1989, at AI. The consortium estimated that since a spill of this magnitude could statisti-
cally occur only once every 241 years, it was no longer cost-effective to retain the team. See 
Egan, supra note 22, at B7. 
31 See DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at 28. 
32 See id. at 36-39, 52-61. 
33 See Egan, supra note 22, at B7. 
M See generally id. 
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the water wreaked havoc on seventeen bird and animal species, only 
two of which have recovered to date.35 Some of these species had im-
portant commercial value.36 For example, the spill affected all levels 
of the fishing industry, especially the commercial fishermen, salmon 
hatcheries and local canneries.37 The spill had consequences for more 
than just commercial interests.38 Subsistence use of wild resources was 
an important aspect of the economy, culture, and way of life of many 
families within the Alaskan native communities before the spill.39 M-
ter the spill, many Alaskan natives ceased to eat species from the sea 
out of fear of contamination throughout the food chain.40 
Throughout the rest of 1989 and into 1990, oil spills dominated 
the nation's consciousness. In June 1989, the World Prodigy spill into 
Narragansett Bay off the coast of Rhode Island, the Presidmt Rivera 
spill into the Delaware River, and the Rachel-B spill into the Houston 
Ship Channel all occurred in a twenty-four period.41 InJune 1990, the 
supertanker Mega Borg exploded and burned in the Gulf of Mexico 
while transferring its cargo to another ship.42 This incident created a 
slick thirty miles wide and eight miles long off the shore of Galveston, 
Texas, and killed four crewmembers.43 These spills led to the conclu-
35 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI. The bald eagle and the river otter have returned to 
their pre-spill numbers, but other species have been less successful in their recovery. See id. 
The total number of animal and bird deaths varies according to the method used to calcu-
late the damage: either counting the recovered bodies or calculating the discrepancies in 
pre-spill and post-spill counts. See id. One source puts the death toll at: between 300,000 
and 645,000 birds (including harlequin ducks, puffins, common murres, and other sea 
birds); between 3500 and 5500 sea otters; and 200 seals (which may be an underestimate, 
since dead seals do not float like birds or otters, but rather sink to the bottom). See generally 
The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill: What Have We Learned, ALASKA'S WILDUFE, Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 11-
12,20,24-25 .. 
36 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI. 
37 See id. Cordova, a town bordering the sound, was considered the heart of the re-
gion's once thriving fishing industry. See id. The town's fishing fleet is now little more than 
half the size it was in 1988. See id. After the spill, three of the town's five canneries closed. 
See id. Two have since reopened, but at reduced production levels. See id. 
38 Seeid. 
39 See James A. Fall, Subsistence Uses of Fish and Wildlife, ALASKA'S WILDUFE, Jan.-Feb. 
1993, at 4. 
40 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI. 
41 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.CAN. 722,723; Matthew 
P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, but Still Unconstitutional: The Oil Pollution Act's Dekgation 
of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1,7-8 (1997). 
4ll Paul S. Edelman, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990,8 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 1,2 (1990). 
431d. 
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sion that the unsafe transportation of oil was a national problem that 
required a serious remedy.44 
II. THE OIL POLLUTION ACT OF 1990 
A. OPA's Primary Provisions: Liability, Prevention, and Compensation 
While these accidents created a fresh public awareness of the 
dangers inherent in transporting oil, Congress had been searching for 
a consensus on oil pollution legislation since 1976.45 For almost 
fifteen years, Congress directed its efforts at the consolidation of oil 
spill response mechanisms under the various federal laws already in 
place.46 These federal laws included section 311 of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA),47 the Deepwater 
Port Act of 1974 (DPA),48 the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 
44 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 724. This re-
port stated that: 
[d. 
[Flour major oil spills within a three-month period suggest that spills are still 
too much of an accepted cost of doing business for the oil shipping industry. 
At the present time, the costs of spilling and paying for its clean-up and dam-
age is not high enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent spills 
and develop effective techniques to contain them. Sound public policy re-
quires reversal of these relative costs. 
45 See S. REp. No. 101-94, at 1-2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 722-23; 
Elizabeth R. Millard, Note, Anatomy of an Oil Spill: The Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS.]' 331,338-39 n.45 (1993). These bills failed primarily be-
cause of differences over liability limits and disagreements over whether a federal scheme 
should preempt state oil pollution laws already in place. See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119 
(1991); Millard, supra, at 340 n.56. Some of these failed bills include: H.R. 14862, Oil Pol-
lution Liability, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (designed to ensure an unlimited compensa-
tion fund for victims of oil pollution) and S. 2083, Oil Pollution Liability and Compensa-
tion (1977) (designed to establish a comprehensive oil pollution and hazardous substances 
compensation fund). Millard, supra, at 338-39. Senate Bill 2083 was modified to address 
only hazardous substances, leading to the enactment of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA). See id. Neither H.R. 
14862 nor S. 2083 was passed in its original form, leaving oil pollution unaddressed. See 
Millard, supra, at 339-40. Attempts to enact oil pollution legislation continued until 1989. 
See, e.g., Millard, supra, at 340 n.56, for a detailed discussion of the extent of Congress's 
fourteen-year effort. 
46 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722,723-24. Con-
gressional displeasure at the deficiency of the existing federal laws is especially apparent in 
the legislative history of OPA, which states, "at least five statutes deal with the issue of oil 
spill liability and compensation. Each is different, and each is inadequate." See id. 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
48 33 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1524 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
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(TAPAA),49 and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments 
of 1978 (OCSLAA).50 This patchwork of legislation also had to coor-
dinate with state laws, international conventions, and other federal 
environmentallaws.51 
The CWA was the primary piece of legislation applicable to oil 
spills prior to the passage of the OPA, but the CWA historically pro-
vided only partial protection.52 The legislative history of OPA cited 
the CWA's gross inadequacy in dealing with spiller responsibility for 
cleanup expenses and the inability of its revolving fund to cover the 
costs of large spills like that of the Exxon Valdez.53 The DPA, TAPAA, 
and OCSLAA imposed greater liability and permitted wider recovery 
than a statute of general application like the CWA.54 However, they 
were also considered deficient because of uneven liability standards 
and a scope of coverage for cleanup costs and damages that applied 
only to the activities that each individual law covered.55 
Ironically, oil spill legislation was once again introduced in Con-
gress just one week before the Valdez spill.56 Following the oil spills in 
Narragansett Bay, the Delaware River, the Houston Ship Channel, and 
49 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1656 (1994). 
50 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1374 (1994 & Supp.1II 1997). 
51 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119; see also Harrington, supra note 41, at 4-5; Millard, 
supra note 45, at 332-38. 
52 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA-N. 722, 724. 
53 See id. The legislative history noted that the CWA's section 311 (k) revolving fund 
had never reached its authorized level of $35 million, leaving its available amount far too 
low to respond adequately to disasters, especially in light of the staggering cleanup costs 
for the Valdez accident. See id. 
54 Harrington, supra note 41, at ~7. 
55 S. REp. No. 101-94, at 3-4 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA-N. 722, 724. The DPA 
pertained to the regulation of deepwater ports by the Secretary of Transportation, estab-
lishing strict liability for discharges of oil within a safety zone surrounding a deepwater 
port and capping such liability at the lesser of $150 per gross ton or $20 million. See 
Millard, supra note 45, at 336 n.33. TAPAA created the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability 
Fund, which imposed strict liability on a vessel's owners and operators for damages result-
ing from vessel-related discharges of oil transported through the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See 
id. at 33~37. Liability under TAPAA was capped at $50 million for the pipeline fund and 
$100 million for owners and operators, with the owner liable for the first $14 million and 
the fund liable for the balance. See id. at 336. OCSLAA pertained to the regulation of oil 
and gas leases on the submerged lands of the Outer Continental Shelf, establishing strict 
liability for costs and damages limited to the greater of $300 per gross ton or $250,000. See 
id. at 337-38. 
56 The Oil Pollution Prevention, Removal, Liability, and Compensation Act of 1989, 
H.R. 1465, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. was introduced on March 16, 1989, by Representative 
Walter B. Jones (D-N.C.) and Representative Robert W. Davis (R-Mich.). See Millard, supra 
note 45, at 340, 346. 
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the Gulf of Mexico during March and June 1989, Congress was at last 
ready to take action and come to an agreement.57 The Exxon Valdez 
tragedy provided the necessary catalyst for resolving congressional 
differences and the passage of a comprehensive bill.58 
The result was OPA,59 a comprehensive oil spill liability, response, 
and compensation statute.60 The 1990 law consolidated the various 
federal liability provisions into one statute, providing cleanup author-
ity, penalties, and liability for oil pollution.61 The primary provisions 
of OPA begin with a "polluter pays" policy that extends liability to all 
responsible parties,62 increases the limits of liability for cleanup 
costs,63 and expands the types of damages recoverable to governments 
and private parties.64 The statute created a single fund to pay for oil 
removal and damages, replacing the funds created under DPA, TA-
PAA, and OCSlAA65 with the federally maintained Oil Spill Liability 
Trust Fund.66 OPA also increased the role of the federal government 
in pollution cleanup and compensation by federalizing these opera-
tions.67 Prevention measures became a part of OPA's federal scheme, 
57 See Harrington, supra note 41, at 7-8; Randle, supra note 3, at 10,119. 
58 Millard, supra note 45, at 346. 
59 Oil Pollution Act of 1990,33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761,26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 9509 (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997); Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484. 
60 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730-31. 
61 See id. 
62 See 33 U .S.C. § 2701 (32)(A) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). "Responsible party" means any 
person owning, operating, or demise chartering the vessel. Id. 
63 See id. § 2704(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The liability for removal costs and dam-
ages of a vessel varies according to its size. Vessels of more than 3000 gross registered tons 
(GRT) are liable for the greater of $1200 per GRT or $10 million. See id. § 2704(a) (1) (A)-
(B) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Vessels of less than 3000 GRT are capped at the greater of 
$1200 per ton or $2 million. See id. § 2704(a) (1) (A)-(C) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
64 See Harrington, supra note 41, at 11. OPA lists six categories of damages: (1) injury 
or destruction of natural resources; (2) loss or injury to real or personal property; (3) loss 
of subsistence use of natural resources; (4) net loss of taxes, royalties, rents, or fees due to a 
governmental entity arising from the destruction or loss of natural resources; (5) lost 
profits or impairment of earning capacity due to the loss or destruction of real or personal 
property or natural resources; and (6) net cost of providing increased or additional public 
services during or after removal activities. See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2)(A)-(F) (1994 & 
Supp. III 1997). 
65 SeeS. REp. No. 101-94, at 9 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730-31. 
66 See 26 U.S.C. § 9509 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 33 U.S.C. § 2712 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997); Harrington, supra note 41, at 12-13. 
67 S. REp. No. 101-94, at 8 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729. OPA re-
quires the President to "coordinate and direct all public and private cleanup efforts wher-
ever there is a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public health or welfare." Id. 
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by requiring contingency planning,68 double hulls,69 and a series of 
personnel licensing measures. 70 Finally, OPA permitted states to sup-
plement its provisions with their own liability and compensation 
schemes.71 
B. OPA's Prince William Sound Provisions 
While the provisions concerning liability, cleanup, and preven-
tion constitute the heart of OPA, OPA's Prince William Sound provi-
sions72 are also important because they raise significant constitutional 
issues in the context of their effect on Exxon and its subsidiary, 
SeaRiver Maritime.73 Whereas OPA addresses oil spill liability, preven-
tion, and cleanup on the national scale, the Prince William Sound 
provisions concern the regional problems and consequences of the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill.74 The impact of the Exxon Valdez accident, a spill 
68 See 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (c) (1) (A)-(B) (1994). The provision addressing contingency 
planning was a response to the uncoordinated and overlapping nature of many oil spill 
contingency plans. See id. It created a new system of contingency planning, consisting of a 
national response unit, Coast Guard strike teams, Coast Guard district response groups, 
add area committees. See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,128. The new statute also revised 
readiness requirements by shifting responsibility for area contingency plans and individual 
vessel and facility response plans from the national level to the individual vessel and facility 
level. See id. 
69 See 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The phasing out of non.<fouble 
hulled vessels began in 1995. See id. § 3703a(c) (3) (A). By the year 2010, all vessels over 
5000 gross tons with single hulls will be prohibited from operating without double hulls, 
and by the year 2015 all vessels over 5000 gross tons with double bottoms or double sides 
will be prohibited from operating without double hulls. See id. § 3703a(c) (3) (A)-(C). Pro-
ponents of double hulls contended that if the Exxon Valdez had been equipped with a dou-
ble hull instead of protectively located ballast tanks, far less oil would have been released. 
See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,132. 
70 See 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2)-(3) (1994) (providing that the licenses of crew members will 
be suspended for drug or alcohol abuse). This provision reflected the perception that 
alcohol was a primary contributor to the Exxon Valdez disaster, especially after evidence 
revealed that Captain Hazelwood had consumed alcohol shortly before the vessel's trip 
through Prince William Sound. See DAVIDSON, supra note 18, at 9-10; Randle, supra note 3, 
at 10,131. Further, a federal law was put in place to prevent any individual from working 
more than 15 hours in any 24-hour period or more than 36 hours in any 72-hour period. 
See46U.S.C.§8104(n) (1994) asamendedbyPub.L.101-380§4114(b) (1994). 
71 S. REp. No. 101-94, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 727-28. Con-
gress deliberately chose not to preempt state laws governing oil pollution liability and 
compensation on the basis that a state is entitled to impose a greater degree of protection 
for its own resources and citizens, thus allowing states to create more stringent liability 
schemes than the federal scheme. See id. 
72 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
73 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9,9 (D.D.C. 1997) 
[hereinafter SeaRiver II] . 
74 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,133-34. 
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that introduced almost eleven million gallons of oil into one of Amer-
ica's most pristine environments, is evident throughout the legislative 
history of OPA.75 Given the circumstances surrounding the accident, 
including an over-tired crew, a captain under the influence of alcohol, 
and an uncoordinated cleanup, the legislative history suggests that 
Congress hoped to create a direct remedy for some of the more dire 
consequences of the accident through the enactment of the Prince 
William Sound provisions.76 
First, OPA established the Prince William Sound Oil Spill Recov-
ery Institute to conduct research and carry out education and dem-
onstration programs.77 The purpose of these programs was to identify 
and develop the best available techniques, equipment, and materials 
for dealing with oil spills in arctic and subarctic environments, and to 
complement the efforts of federal and state governments in under-
standing the long-range effects of oil spills on Prince William Sound's 
environment.7s OPA also created two programs to involve the oil in-
dustry, the government, and local communities in a partnership re-
sponsible for the environmental monitoring of the terminal facilities 
in Prince William Sound and Cook Inlet.79 The statute established 
several different associations to carry out these environmental moni-
toring programs, including: an Oil Terminal Facilities and Oil Tanker 
Operations Association, designed to monitor the operation and main-
tenance policies of oil terminals and crude oil tankers;so and a Re-
gional Citizens' Advisory Councils1 with representatives from virtually 
every segment of the population to provide environmental monitor-
75 See, e.g., S. REp. No. 101-94, at 2-3,18-19 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 
723-24, 740; Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act ofl990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1144, 1144 
(Aug. 18, 1990). 
76 See Randle, supra note 3, at 10,128, 10,131, 10,133. 
77 See 33 U.S.C. § 2731 (a)-(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
78 See 33 U.S.C. § 2731(b)(I)-(2). In its original form, OPA formed this institute to 
study the effects of the Exxon Valdez oil spill. See id. However, the law was amended in 1996, 
replacing the words "Exxon Valdez oil spill" with "arctic or subarctic," effectively broadening 
the scope of the institute's purpose to a more generalized one. See Pub. L. No. 104-324, 
§ 1102(a) (3), no Stat. 3964 (1996) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 2731). The Institute has 16 
members who are representatives from various state agencies, federal departments, the 
fishing industry, Alaskan natives, the oil and gas industry, residents of communities af-
fected by the Exxon Valdez spill, and Alaskan scientific institutes. See Oil Pollution Act of 
1990,33 U.S.C. § 2731 (c) (1) (A)-(H). 
79 See id. § 2732 (b) . 
so Seeid. § 2732(c). 
81 Seeid. § 2732(d)(I). 
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ing,82 and to review and assess measures for oil spill prevention and 
response.83 
In addition to the establishment of advisory councils and sci-
entific programs, the Prince William Sound provisions introduced 
measures directed at specific aspects of the Exxon Valdez. accident. 
Congress ordered the installation of a navigation light on Bligh Reef84 
and the installation of equipment to track the movements of tanker 
vessels through Prince William Sound with the ability to alert tracking 
personnel when tankers departed from designated navigation 
routes.85 The provisions also directed tanker and facility response 
plans to provide for oil spill containment and removal equipment in 
nearby communities,86 the establishment of an oil spill removal or-
ganization at appropriate locations in Prince William Sound,87 and 
training, practice exercises, and periodic testing of equipment for oil 
removal, to address the lack of available equipment after the Valdez. 
spill.88 
Finally, the most dramatic, and perhaps most drastic, provision, 
section 5007 states that all tank vessels that have spilled more than 
one million gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 
22, 1989, are prohibited from operating in Prince William Sound.89 
When the bill went into conference committee, Senator Ted Stevens 
of Alaska inserted this particular provision, and it passed with no de-
bate or discussion.90 At the time OPA was signed into law, no other 
vessel fulfilled the conditions set out in the statute, nor has any other 
vessel met them since, making this provision of the federal law appli-
cable to only the former Exxon Valdez.. 91 
82 Seeid. § 2732(e) (1)-(2). 
83 See Oil Pollution Act ofl990, 33 V.S.C. § 2732(f) (1)-(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). 
84 See id. § 2733. 
85 See id. § 2734. 
86 Seeid. § 2735(a) (1). 
87 See id. § 2735(a) (2). 
88 See 33 V.S.C. § 2735(a) (3)-(5). 
89 See 33 V.S.C. § 2737. The statute states: "[nlot withstanding any other law, tank ves-
sels that have spilled more than 1,000,000 gallons of oil into the marine environment after 
March 22, 1989, are prohibited from operating on the navigable waters of Prince William 
Sound, Alaska." Id. 
90 See generally S. REp. No. 101-94 (1989), reprinted in 1990 V.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 722-47; 
Bill Richards, Exxon is Battling a Ban on an Infamous Tanker, WALL ST J"july 29, 1998, at Bl. 
9) See Richards, supra note 90, at Bl. 
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President George Bush signed OPA into law on August 18, 
1990.92 The outcome for the United States has been positive.93 The 
law's liability and compensation scheme fundamentally changed the 
way the United States manages oil spill prevention and response, and 
is credited with reducing the risk of massive tanker spills.94 However, 
OPA's aftereffects continue to take their toll on Exxon and its subsidi-
aries.95 
III. THE LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EXXON VALDEZ SPILL AND THE 
ENACTMENT OF OPA 
A. Exxon Settles Its Litigation 
For Exxon, the consequences of the Valdez spill included not only 
the passage of OPA, but also various other financial and legal 
ramifications.96 The corporation gave the Valdez a $30 million over-
haul, and dispatched the vessel to the Mediterranean Sea to shuttle 
Middle Eastern oil to various ports.97 It was back in service under the 
name Exxon Mediterranean about the same time that OPA was signed.98 
A few years later, the vessel was renamed again, this time becoming 
the SeaRiver Mediterranean in acknowledgement of its new owner, 
Exxon's United States shipping subsidiary, SeaRiver Maritime Finan-
cial Holdings.99 
In September 1991, one year after OPA was passed, Exxon en-
tered into a consent decree with the United States and Alaska, settling 
all civil and criminal matters resulting from the Valdez spill for $1 bil-
lion. too A federal jury in Anchorage awarded thousands of fishermen, 
92 Statement on Signing the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1144, 1144 (Aug. 
18,1990). 
9~ See Oil and Gas Newsletter, OIL & GASj., May 3,1999, at 3. 
94 See id. U.S. Secretary of Transportation attributed the drastic reduction in oil spills 
to OPA's liability scheme, noting that since OPA's passage, tanker spills have been limited 
to only 22,429 gallons. See id.; see also U.S. Logs 7 Years Without Massive Oil Spill, OIL & GAS 
j., Aug. 19,1996, at 36. 
95 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI. 
96 See id. 
97 See id.; Martin, supra note 17, at AI; Sedendo, Exxon Valdez is Given New Name, New 
Venue, BOSTON GLOBE,July 7,1990, at 3. 
98 Sedendo, supra note 97, at 3. Gus Elmer, president of Exxon Shipping Company, at-
tributed the relocation of the vessel to declining Alaska crude oil and the renaming to 
Exxon's policy of naming vessels according to their location. See id. 
99 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24. 
100 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings v. Pena, 952 F. Supp.9, 9 (D. D.C. 1997) 
(SeaRiver /1); see also Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24. The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee 
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natives, and property owners a larger punitive damage verdict of $5.3 
billion against Exxon in 1994.101 The verdict was compensation for the 
economic losses of thousands of native villagers, fisherman, and 
property owners who were harmed by the spill.102 
B. The SeaRiver Litigation: Texas, the District of Columbia, and Alaska 
Despite the consent decree, the litigation between the United 
States and Exxon continued. l03 In 1996, SeaRiver Maritime brought 
suit in federal district court in Houston, Texas, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that section 5007 ofOPA is unconstitutional.104 
SeaRiver Maritime alleged that section 5007 is an unconstitu-
tional bill of attainder because the SeaRiver Mediterranean is the only 
vessel in the United States to which section 5007 applies, both now 
and when the statute was passed in 1990.105 Further, SeaRiver Mari-
time argued that the statute effectively bars the SeaRiver Mediterranean 
from participating in any trade from Alaska to other U.S. ports, thus 
thwarting the purpose for which the vessel was originally con-
structed. l06 Among SeaRiver Maritime's claims was that OPA bars the 
SeaRiver Mediterranean from Prince William Sound, so that she has had 
no access to Port Valdez.l07 Not only is the SeaRiver Mediterranean in 
fine mechanical condition after her 1990 overhaul, but her identical 
Council now guides the spending of the funds from the 1991 civil settlement toward clean-
ing beaches and buying parcels of land in an effort to remedy the environmental damage 
and restore wildlife. See Goldberg, supra note 23, at 24. 
101 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI; Allen, supra note 19, at AI. Exxon appealed the 
$5.3 billion punitive judgment, arguing that the corporation was wrongly blamed for prob-
lems far beyond the accident. Allen, supra note 19, at AI. The Ninth Circuit recently re-
jected Exxon's appeal that the verdict should be overturned because of irregularities dur-
ing jury deliberations but did not decide the more specific issue of amount of damages. See 
Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 206 F.3d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 2000), 
petitionforcert. denied, 69 U.S.L.w. 3087 (U.S. July 14, 2000) (No. 00-90). 
102 See Allen, supra note 19, at AI. 
103 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d 756 (D. Alaska 
1998) (SeaRiver /Il); SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp.9; SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. V. 
Pena, 952 F. Supp.455 (S.D. Tex. 1996) [hereinafter SeaRiver I]. More specifically, the 
litigation has been between the United States Department of Justice and Department of 
Transportation and Exxon's United States shipping subsidiary, SeaRiver Maritime Finan-
cial Holdings. SeaRiver Maritime is currently the owner of the SeaRiver Mediterranean, and 
her identical sister ship, SeaRiver Long Beach, among others. See For Now, at Least, Infamous 
Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5. 
104 SeaRiver 1, 952 F. Supp. at 456. 
105 See id. at 457, 459 n.8. 
106 See id. at 457. 
107 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at AI. 
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sister ship, SeaRiver Long Beach, currently operates in Prince William 
Sound. lOS According to SeaRiver Maritime, prohibiting the vessel from 
operating in the Prince William Sound has diminished the value of 
the vessel and resulted in considerably lower profit margins than 
would be possible on the Alaska run. IOO As a result, operation of the 
vessel in the Middle East has forced the SeaRiver Mediterranean to face 
far more competition than she would have in the American Pacific, 
making her much less cost efficient.110 
In defense, the government asserted that venue in Houston was 
improper and that the District Court of Alaska was the appropriate 
court to hear the case.1l1 SeaRiver Maritime's attempt to have its 
claims heard in Texas was undoubtedly a strategic maneuver to secure 
a friendlier jurisdiction than could be found in Alaska.112 Accordingly, 
the corporation argued that venue was appropriate in Houston be-
cause it resides in Houston and a substantial part of the events or 
omissions that gave rise to the claim occurred there.ll3 The district 
court in Texas held that SeaRiver Maritime's decisions in Houston 
regarding the SeaRiver Mediterranean and the harm felt in Houston by 
the vessel's inability to operate in Prince William Sound did not bear 
a sufficiently substantial connection to the events giving rise to the 
corporation's claim.114 Since there was no basis for venue in Texas, the 
suit was dismissed without prejudice and SeaRiver Maritime was given 
108 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI; For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from 
Alaska, supra note 18, at 5. 
109 See Richards, supra note 90, at Bl. 
110 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at AI. 
m SeaRiver l, 952 F. Supp. at 457-58. The government claimed that Alaska was the 
venue in which past events had occurred and future actions would take place. See id. at 
459. Specifically, the Valdez implicated section 5007 by spilling 11 million gallons of oil in 
the District of Alaska, and this is also the place where the vessel would have to operate 
before section 5007 would be violated and could be enforced. See id. Furthermore, the 
government argued that the 1991 consent decree placed jurisdiction with the district court 
of Alaska. See id. at 461 n.12. 
112 See Richards, supra note 90, at Bl. 
m See SeaRiver l, 952 F. Supp. at 458. SeaRiver Maritime made these two arguments in 
an effort to satisry the venue requirements of the federal venue statute, which provides that 
a civil action in which the defendant is the federal government may be brought: (1) where 
the defendant resides, (2) where a "substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise 
to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action 
is situated," or (3) "where the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action." 
See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (e) (1994); SeaRiver l, 952 F. Supp. at 458. 
114 SeaRiver I, 952 F. Supp. at 461. 
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the opportunity to select either the District of Columbia or Alaska as 
the forum in which to bring their suit. l15 
SeaRiver Maritime chose to refile its claims in the District of Co-
lumbia, again challenging section 5007 on the basis that it violated 
the due process and double jeopardy clauses of the Fifth Amendment, 
constituted a bill of attainder in violation of Article I, section 9 of the 
Constitution, and operated as an ex post facto law in violation of Arti-
cle I, section 9.116 In the interim, however, the district court in Texas 
reconsidered and elected to transfer the case to the District of Co-
lumbia. ll7 In doing so, the Texas court noted that it was not taking a 
position that the District of Columbia was a better forum than Alaska, 
but rather that it was proper venue under federal law. 118 Again, the 
government made a motion to transfer the suit to Alaska for either 
improper venue119 or the doctrine of forum non conveniens.120 
The district court in the District of Columbia decided that the 
factors weighing in favor of keeping the case in the District of Colum-
bia did not outweigh the interest of the state of Alaska.l2l While the 
District of Columbia was the forum chosen by SeaRiver Maritime and 
a forum where the government could defend the action without any 
great inconvenience, the court reasoned that there would be virtually 
no discovery and no issues relating to convenience of witnesses.122 
Rather, the issues would most likely be decided on a motion for sum-
115 Id. at 462. In addition to opposing a change of venue, SeaRiver Maritime petitioned 
the court to transfer the suit to the District of Columbia as an alternative. See id. The Gov-
ernment opposed this motion, arguing that comity required transfer to Alaska, in accor-
dance with the 1991 consent decree between the parties that reserved jurisdiction for fur-
ther orders, direction, or relief to the District of Alaska. See id. at 461 n.12. The Texas 
district court initially declined to transfer the case to Alaska or the District of Columbia, 
giving SeaRiver Maritime the opportunity to select its own forum. See id. at 462. 
116 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D. D.C. 1997) 
(SeaRiver II) . 
117 Seeid. 
118 See id. 
119 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1994). The statute states that a "district court of a 
district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, 
or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it 
could have been brought." See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). 
120 See SeaRivcr II, 952 F. Supp. at 10; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) (1994). The statute 
states that "for the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district 
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought." See 28 U.S.C. §1404(a). Under this doctrine, the court determined whether 
it was in the interest of justice to transfer the matter to Alaska by weighing the various in-
terests of the parties. See SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. at 11. 
121 See id. 
122 See id. 
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mary judgment, thus avoiding an evidentiary trial.123 Given these cir-
cumstances, there were simply not enough factors to outweigh 
Alaska's strong interests in the suit.124 In addition, the District of 
Alaska had retained jurisdiction to interpret the 1991 consent decree, 
and there was a genuine issue as to whether SeaRiver Maritime waived 
its right to challenge section 5007 of OPA by signing the consent de-
cree.125 The court held that the District of Alaska was in the best posi-
tion to determine the applicability of the decree to the facts of the 
case.126 
Additional considerations that called for transfer to Alaska in-
cluded what the district court of the District of Columbia called the 
state's "extraordinary interest in the outcome of this suit" and the 
"immeasurable damage to the people and ecology of Alaska" inflicted 
by the Exxon Valdez. 127 The district court of the District of Columbia 
recognized the interest of Alaskan citizens to participate in the pro-
ceedings arising out of this case and transferred it to Alaska.128 
By the time the case reached Alaska, almost two years had passed 
since SeaRiver Maritime first filed suit in Texas.l29 For the Alaska dis-
trict court, the issue was not whether section 5007 of OPA was uncon-
stitutional, but rather whether the content and intent of the consent 
decree (that supposedly settled all claims between the parties), would 
allow this challenge.130 
First, the court noted that the consent decree made clear that 
Exxon and the United States were settling any and all claims.l31 In the 
consent decree, where the parties had meant to except a matter from 
the reach of that term, they expressly included an exception.132 Since 
no exception existed for constitutional claims that may have arisen 
out of the Exxon Valdez accident, the court reasoned that the parties 
123 See id. 
124 See id. 
125 See SeaRiver II, 952 F. Supp. at 11. 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 12. 
129 The district court in Alaska issued its decision in July 1998, almost two years after 
the district court in Texas first heard the corporation'S claims in September 1996. See 
SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Slater, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 756 (D. Alaska 1998) 
(SeaRiver III). 
130 See id. 
13l See id. 
132 See id. 
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were buying complete peace for all but certain very specifically enu-
merated matters.133 
The Alaska district court also focused on the sophistication of the 
parties, who were represented by a substantial number of experienced 
and competent lawyers and were unlikely to have signed on to the 
terms of the agreement "without parsing them with extraordinary 
care."134 Thus, the failure to mention constitutional claims still did not 
protect SeaRiver Maritime from the general idea that any and all is-
sues between the parties were settled.135 The dispute over whether the 
SeaRiver Mediterranean was unconstitutionally barred from Prince Wil-
liam Sound was constrained by the terms of the 1991 consent decree, 
and SeaRiver Maritime was not permitted to litigate its claims.136 
IV. THE BILL OF ATTAINDER CLAUSE 
Although the federal district court in Alaska held that the 1991 
consent decree prevented the parties from litigating the constitu-
tional issues that SeaRiver raised, the merits of SeaRiver Maritime's 
claims bear discussion.137 Specifically, SeaRiver Maritime's bill of at-
tainder challenge to OPA raises interesting questions about the le-
gitimacy of section 5007. To address these questions, it is necessary to 
discuss the elements of bills of attainder, the origin and justifications 
for the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder, and the Su-
preme Court's test for analyzing whether a legislative action consti-
tutes a bill of attainder. Further, an overview of the recent uses of the 
bill of attainder challenge is instructive for describing the interpreta-
tion currently employed by the federal circuit courts. 
A. Bills of Attainder 
In England, a bill of attainder was a parliamentary act that sen-
tenced a named individual or identifiable members of a group to 
death.138 It was most often used to punish political activities that Par-
liament or the sovereign found threatening or treasonous.139 The 
133 See id. at 756--57 
134 See SeaRiver Ill, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 756. 
135 See id. 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
138 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 473 (1977). 
139 See Welsh, supra note 6, at 83. The attainder of death was usually accompanied by a 
forfeiture of the condemned person's property to the King and corruption of his blood, 
2000] Challenging the Oil PoUution Act of 1990 137 
United States Constitution expressly prohibits the federal government 
from enacting bills of attainder through the Bill of Attainder Clause 
(Clause).I40 This constitutional directive has also come to encompass 
bills of pains and penalties. HI Under English law, a bill of pains and 
penalties was identical to a bill of attainder, except that it prescribed a 
punishment short of death such as: banishment, deprivation of the 
right to vote, exclusion of the designated individual's sons from Par-
liament, or the punitive confiscation of property.H2 The Supreme 
Court has consistently defined a bill of attainder as "law that legisla-
tively determines guilt and inflicts punishment upon an identifiable 
individual without provision of the protections of a judicial trial. "143 
B. Historical justifications fw Prohibiting Bills of Attainder 
The Clause's prohibition on bills of attainder derives from two 
sources.J44 The Framers' first goal was to prevent the deprivation of 
individual rights by the legislature.H5 Their second, and more impor-
tant goal was to preserve the integrity of the new government's sepa-
ration of powers and system of government.l46 
In forbidding bills of attainder, the Framers of the Constitution 
sought to prohibit the English Parliament's ancient practice of pun-
ishing specifically designated persons or groups without trial.H7 In this 
such that his heirs were denied the right to inherit his estate. See id. at 84; see also Nixon, 
433 U.S. at 475 n.35. 
140 "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, 
cl. 3. States are also forbidden to enact bills of attainder: 
[N]o State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Let-
ters of Marque or Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Things 
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of At-
tainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or 
grant any Title of Nobility. 
SeeU.s. CONST. art. I. § 10, cl. 1. 
141 The Court first used this broad approach in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 
138 (1810), holding: "[a] bill of attainder may affect the life of an individual, or may 
confiscate his property, or may do both." [d. 
142 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1965). The Supreme Court has 
recognized these punishments in various forms, and has also construed punishment to 
include the exclusion of an individual or group from participation in a specified employ-
ment or vocation. SeeNixon, 433 U.S. at 474. 
143 [d. at 468. 
144 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444-45; United Statesv. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317-18 (1946). 
145 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444-45; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317-18. 
146 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444-45; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317-18. 
147 See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 
(1984). 
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respect, the Clause serves as a bulwark against tyranny.l48 As partici-
pants in a rebellion themselves, the Framers were well aware of the 
danger inherent in special legislative acts that took away the life, lib-
erty, or property of particular persons merely because Parliament or 
the sovereign thought them guilty and deserving of punishment.149 
Further, "[i]n the aftermath of the American Revolution, the Framers 
of the American Constitution also saw many anti-loyalist statutes en-
acted throughout the states, including numerous bills of attainder 
and pains and penalties. "150 When placed in this context, it is evident 
that the Framers intended to safeguard the people of this country 
from punishment without trial in duly constituted courts.151 
The Clause, however, also has practical consequences for our sys-
tem of government. Specifically, the sanction against bills of attainder 
serves two purposes: to ensure that the legislature is confined to 
rulemaking and prohibited from conducting trials and to protect the 
separation of powers by preventing the legislature from assuming the 
functions of the judiciary. 152 As such, the Clause reflects the Framers' 
belief that Congress is not as well-suited to the task of determining 
guilt and levying punishment as politically independent judges and 
juries.153 
148 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 443. 
149 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317-18. The Lovett Court explicitly recognized this, saying: 
"[ W 1 hen our Constitution and Bill of Rights were written, our ancestors had ample reason 
to know that legislative trials and punishments were too dangerous to liberty to exist in the 
nation of free men they had envisioned. And so they prescribed bills of attainder." [d. at 
318. 
150 Welsh, supra note 6, at 84. The Supreme Court also recognized this history in 
Brown. See381 U.S. at 442. 
151 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 445; Lovett, 328 U.S. at 317; Welsh, supra note 6, at 84. The 
Brown court relied on the sentiments of James Madison: 
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of con-
tracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social contract, and to every 
principle of sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the 
declarations prefixed to some of the state constitutions, and all of them are 
prohibited by the spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own 
experience has taught us, nevertheless, that additional fences against these 
dangers ought not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the conven-
tion added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and pri-
vate rights. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 44 (James Madison). See Brown, 381 U.S. at 444 n.18. 
152 See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.9(c), at 684 (3d ed. 1999); see also Brown, 381 U.S. at 444. 
153 See Brown, 381 U.S. at 445. 
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In addition, in a system of government that relies on the pre-
sumption that each branch will refrain from performing the tasks of 
the others, the Clause serves as a barrier, erected to ensure that the 
legislature will not overstep the bounds of its authority and perform 
the functions of the other departments.I54 The Clause restrains Con-
gress from usurping judicial functions in the same way that Article III 
of the Constitution confines the judicial branch to the task of adjudi-
cating concrete cases or controversies.I55 The Supreme Court has 
stated that the Clause "was intended not as a narrow, technical ... 
prohibition, but rather as an implementation of the separation of 
powers, a general safeguard against legislative exercise of the judicial 
function, or more simply-trial by legislature. "156 Thus, the dual ra-
tionale of the separation of powers or fear of over-concentration in 
anyone branch of our government, and the feeling that the charac-
teristics of various departments render them suitable for different 
jobs, is reflected in the Clause.I57 
C. The Supreme Court's Analysis of Bills of Attainder 
The Supreme Court has developed a test to determine when a 
law inflicts prohibited punishment, and thus constitutes a bill of at-
tainder.I58 The two-part inquiry examines the law for both specificity 
154 See id. at 444. Concern that the legislature would overstep its bounds is evident 
throughout the Federalist Papers, especially in the words of James Madison: 
[I]n a representative republic, where executive magistracy is carefully limited, 
both in the extent and the duration of its power; and where the legislative 
power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a supposed influence 
over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is 
sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a multitude, yet 
not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the objects of its passions by 
means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition of this 
department that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all 
their precautions. 
THE F"EOERAUST No. 48 Uames Madison). 
155 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 469. 
156 Broom, 381 U.S. at 442; see also Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A 
Suggested Approach to the BiU of Attainder Clause, 72 YALE LJ. 330, 342-43 (1962). 
157 See Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification, supra note 156, at 345. 
158 See, e.g., SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 154 F.3d 
226,233 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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and punishment.l59 Unless both elements are found, a law is not an 
unconstitutional bill of attainder.1oo 
1. Specificity 
The first inquiry is whether the legislature has acted with 
specificity.I61 Although bills of attainder were historically directed at 
specific individuals, this sanction also applies to those laws directed 
toward a whole group or readily ascertainable members of a group.162 
For example, a law that punishes particularly named individuals is a 
bill of attainder and a violation of the Clause.163 However, a law does 
not have to name specific individuals to be a bill of attainder. I64 If a 
law names a group, or even describes a group, such that it may be 
readily ascertained that the law is directed at that specific group, this 
may also constitute a bill of attainder. 165 
Satisfaction of the specificity strand alone is not sufficient to find 
that a particular law implicates the Clause, let alone violates it.166 The 
proscription against bills of attainder applies to statutes only when 
they inflict punishment on a specified individual or group.I67 
159 See id. at 233. 
160 See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 851 
(1984); BellSouth Corp. V. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678, 683 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (BellSouth II). 
161 See SBC Communication, 154 F.3d at 233. 
162 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. 
(4 Wall.) 277,323 (1866). 
163 See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 316. Lovett is one of the starkest examples of a bill of attainder. 
In that case, Congress passed section 304 of the Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act of 
1943, which named three government employees, labeled them as subversive, and then 
provided that no salary should be paid to them. See id. at 304-05,311-12. The employees 
brought suit. See id. at 305--06. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor, holding that sec-
tion 304 was a punishment of named individuals without a judicial trial. See id. at 315. 
164 See United States V. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 461 (1965). 
165 See id. at 461. In Brown, the petitioner challenged a federal law making it a crime for 
a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or as an employee of a labor un-
ion. See id. at 439. The federal law prescribed a punishment of either one-year imprison-
ment or a $10,000 fine. See id. at 439 n.l. While the law did not refer to the petitioner by 
name, the law was still held to be a bill of attainder. See id. at 440. The Court refused to 
distinguish this law, which inflicted deprivation on members of the Communist Party, from 
the type of law challenged in Lovett, which listed named individuals. See id. at 461. 
166 See Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 
851 (1984). 
167 See id. 
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2. Punishment 
The second inquiry is whether the legislative action imposes a 
punishment. l68 The Court makes three necessary inquiries to make 
this determination.l69 First, the Court determines whether the law 
imposes a punishment of the sort traditionally prohibited by the 
Clause.170 Second, the Court employs a functional test, analyzing 
whether the law can reasonably be said to further non-punitive goals 
in light of the type and severity of the burdens imposed. l7l Third, the 
Court utilizes a motivational test to determine whether the legislative 
record evinces a congressional intent to punish.172 Since the proscrip-
tion against bills of attainder only reaches statutes that inflict punish-
ment on a specified individual or group, the punishment factor has 
become a critical element of the overall test.17!! 
a. The Test for Traditional Punishment 
The Court's first determination is whether the challenged law 
imposes a punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the 
Clause,l74 Such punishment at English common law included impris-
onment, banishment, and the punitive confiscation of property by the 
sovereign.175 In our own country, the list of punishments forbidden by 
the Clause has been expanded to include legislation that bars partici-
pation by individuals or groups in specific employment or profes-
sions,l76 . 
The Court's prohibition of bars to employment or specified voca-
tions began with its holdings in Cummings v. Missoun177 and a compan-
ion case, Ex Parte Garland.178 Cummings involved the constitutionality 
168 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 154 F.3d 226, 
233 (5th Cir. 1998). 
169 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852; Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 
473,475-78 (1977). 
170 See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 1999); ROTUNDA & 
NOWAK, supra note 152, at 685. 
171 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475-78; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066. 
172 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066; BellSouth Corp. v. Federal 
Communications Comm 'n, 162 F.3d 678, 684 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BeUSauth II ). 
173 See Sekctive Serv., 468 U.S. at 851. 
174 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1066; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 152, at 685. 
175 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474. 
176 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 852; Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277,319-
20 (1866); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,377 (1866). 
177 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 319-20. 
178 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377. 
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of amendments to the Missouri Constitution of 1865, which provided 
that no one could engage in a number of specified professions unless 
he first swore that he had taken no part in the rebellion against the 
Union,179 Cummings, a priest, was disqualified from practicing as a 
clergyman because he could not truthfully take the oath.180 At issue in 
Garland was a federal statute that required attorneys to take a similar 
oath before they could practice in federal courts.181 The Court struck 
down both provisions as bills of attainder on the ground that each was 
a legislative punishment directed toward a specific group: clergymen 
and lawyers who had taken part in the rebellion and thus were pre-
vented from truthfully taking the oath.182 Thus a law is a bill of attain-
der if it permanently deprives an individual or group through the 
confiscation of property, bars participation in a specified vocation or 
employment, imprisonment, or takes the form of any other tradi-
tional form ofpunishment.183 
b. The Functional Test 
The functional test seeks to determine whether the law, when 
viewed in terms of the type and severity of the burdens imposed, rea-
sonably furthers legitimate, nonpunitive legislative goals.184 "Even 
measures historically associated with punishment ... have been oth-
erwise regarded when the non punitive aims of an apparently prophy-
lactic measure have seemed sufficiently clear and convincing. "185 That 
is, when a legislative action has legitimate, nonpunitive purposes, a 
court will be prevented from striking it down, even if it seemingly im-
179 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 279-82. 
180 See id. 
lSI 71 U.S. at 334-37. 
IS2 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 319-20; Garland, 71 U.S. at 377. 
IS3 See Cummings, 71 U.S. at 319-20; Garland, 71 U.S. at 377; see also Selective Servo Sys. 
V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852-53 (1984). The permanent 
deprivation element of this inquiry is especially important. In Selective Service, the Court 
held that disqualitying male students who failed to register for the draft from receiving 
federal financial aid was not a bill of attainder because the statute left open the possibility 
of qualitying for aid. See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 843-46, 850-51. More specifically, the 
Court held that uappellees can become eligible for ... aid at any time simply by registering 
late." !d. at 853. 
IS4 See Nixon V. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977). 
IS5 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-5, at 655 (2d ed. 1988). 
Tribe goes on to say that measures enacted not in order to punish but in order to prevent 
future harm are condemned as bills of attainder when these measures have been thought 
to rest on a legislative determination that particular persons have shown themselves to be 
blameworthy. See id; see also BellSouth Corp. V. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 
678, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (hereinafter BelLSouth II). 
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plicates the specificity and traditional punishment aspects of the in-
quiry.l86 Such legitimate goals have included encouraging draft regis-
tration,187 guaranteeing the availability of evidence at criminal trials,188 
preserving historical records,189 and encouraging competition in for-
merly monopolized markets.190 Thus, it must be established that the 
legislature's action constitutes punishment and not merely the legiti-
mate regulation of conduct.191 
Put differently: 
[t]he question in each case where unpleasant consequences 
are brought to bear on an individual for prior conduct is 
whether the legislative aim was to punish ... or whether the 
186 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688. 
187 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 854 (finding that law that conditioned financial aid 
benefits on draft registration had a legitimate legislative purpose). 
186 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 477-78. Here, the Court held that a law had a legitimate legis-
lative purpose when it directed the Administrator of General Services to take former 
President Nixon's personal documents and tape recordings into custody, since it was guar-
anteeing the availability of this evidence at criminal trials. See id. This was directly related to 
"congress's responsibility to the due process of law in the fair administration of criminal 
justice." See id. at 477. 
189 See id. at 478. 
190 See BeUSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688-90 (holding that Congress had a legitimate non-
punitive purpose in conditioning telephone company's entrance into long distance mar-
kets on opening of local markets to competition). 
191 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 476 n.40. It is important to note, however, that Brown held 
that the definition of punishment should not be limited to retributive actions. See United 
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458 (1965). "Punishment serves several purposes; retributive, 
rehabilitative, deterrent-and preventive." Id. at 458. Thus, a law may be a bill of attainder 
even if it is enacted for preventive purposes. See id. The touchstone appears to be the class 
to whom the law applies. For example, the Court compared the facts of Brown to those in 
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See Broum, 381 U.S. at 439 n.2, 
458-60. In Brown, the law prevented anyone who was presently a member of the Commu-
nist Party or who had been a member of the Party during the previous five years from serv-
ing as a union officer. See id. at 439. In comparison, in Douds, the plaintiff challenged a law 
that sought to prevent Communist Party membership in labor unions. See 339 U.S. at 385. 
However, the Douds Court held there was a decisive distinction between laws that punished 
for past actions and the challenged law, which made individuals subject to a possible future 
loss. Id. at 414. The Court reasoned that: "[h]ere the intention is to forestall dangerous 
acts; there is no one who may not by a voluntary alteration of the loyalties which impel him 
to action become eligible to sign the affidavit." Id. Thus, the law in Douds, which would fail 
to apply to a union member if he simply resigned from the party, was intrinsically different 
from the law in Brown, which retroactively punished a union member for membership in 
the Communist Party during the previous five years. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 439; Douds, 339 
U.S. at 413-14. This introduces an inescapability element into consideration of any legisla-
tive action alleged to violate the Clause, so that there is a distinction between those laws 
that allow an individual to escape from a future deprivation, as opposed to those which 
impose a punishment on individuals for wholly past conduct. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 439; 
Douds, 339 U.S. at 413-14. 
144 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28: 119 
restriction of the individual comes about as a relevant inci-
dent to a regulation of a present situation .... 192 
Courts have generally applied a balancing test to determine whether 
legislation is a punitive measure or the legitimate regulation of con-
duct.193 The Court weighs the public's needs, as interpreted by Con-
gress, against the law's detrimental effect on the named individual or 
group to ascertain if it survives scrutiny under the Clause.l94 
For example, in Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, Inc.,195 
gun clubs and gun manufacturers challenged a California law that 
classified certain assault weapons and proscribed their manufacture, 
sale, and possession.I96 The plaintiffs claimed that the law unconstitu-
tionally inflicted punishment within the meaning of the Clause.197 
However, the Ninth Circuit held that the California legislature had a 
legitimate justification for passing the law, since they had found that 
assault weapons presented an unreasonable harm to human life.19B 
Thus, the law was a legitimate regulation of conduct. 199 
However, in other rare instances when there is no legitimate leg-
islative purpose, the Supreme Court will find that the law was enacted 
with the purpose of punishing the individuals disadvantaged by the 
law.2OO The Court has relied upon the prohibition against bills of at-
tainder only five times to strike down legislation.201 Correspondingly, 
192 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960); see also Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 
1066,1072 (7th Cir. 1994). In Dehainaut, President Reagan directed that air traffic control-
lers who participated in a 1981 strike be indefinitely barred after they ignored his order to 
return to work. See Dehainaut, 32 F.3d at 1068-69. The controllers sued, alleging that the 
directive violated the Constitution as a bill of attainder. See id. at 1070. However, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the directive was a non punitive, protective measure "to protect the 
efficiency of the FAA's operations" and "the safe and effective performance of the nation's 
air traffic control system." [d. at 1072. 
193 Seeid. 
194 Seeid., see also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 475-76 (1977). 
195 965 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992). 
196 See id. at 724. 
197 See id. at 725. 
198 See id. at 728. 
199 See id. 
200 See Nixon v.Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 476 (1977). 
201 See generally United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1960) (striking down statute that 
imposed sanctions on one who was a member of the Communist Party and an officer or 
employee of a labor union); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946) (striking down 
statute that cut off the salary of three named federal employees based on their member-
ship in the Communist Party); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872) (mem.) 
(striking down West Virginia loyalty oath); Ex Parte Garland, 7I U.S. (4 Wall.) 366 (1866) 
(striking down statute that required attorneys to take oath that they had not aided the 
Confederacy); Cummings v. Missouri, 7I U.S. (4 Wall.) 356 (1866) (striking down amend-
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there have been few times when the Court has found that legislation 
was enacted with the specific purpose of punishing an individua1.202 
Perhaps the best example of a law enacted exclusively for a puni-
tive purpose is seen in United States v. Broum.203 There, Congress en-
acted the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 
making it a crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as 
an officer or employee of a labor union.204 The Supreme Court found 
that the law's only purpose was to inflict deprivations on blameworthy 
individuals in order to prevent their future misconduct, which was 
prohibited by the Clause as an impermissible punitive objective under 
the functional test for punishment.205 
c. The Motivational Test 
Third, the Court must determine whether the legislative record 
evinces a congressional intent to punish.2OO This task is accomplished 
by looking directly at the legislative history of the law in question, in-
cluding the Senate and House Committee Reports and floor de-
bates.207 For example, when the legislative history specifically men-
tions an individual by name or condemns a person's behavior as 
meriting the infliction of punishment, it may fairly be said that Con-
gress's intent was punitive, and not merely regulatory.208 However, iso-
lated statements do not rise to the level of unmistakable evidence of 
punitive intent that is required to strike down a law as a bill of attain-
der.209 For a law to withstand a bill of attainder challenge, it must be 
clear that Congress lacked the intent to punish.21o 
ments to state constitution that barred people from participating as clergy as well as other 
professions because they had aided or sympathized with the Confederacy). 
202 See supra note 201. 
203 See 381 U.S. 437 (1960). 
204 See id. at 439 n.1. 
203 See id. at 460-61. 
206 See Nixon v. Adminstrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977). 
207 See id. at 478-79. 
208 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 314 (1946). The facts in Lovett are a strong 
example of the congressional intent at issue here. See id. The Court found that Congress's 
intent was clear when it named three named individuals, stigmatized their reputations, and 
seriously impaired their chances to earn a living. See id. at 314. But cJ. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 
479. 
209 See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 
856 n.15 (1946). 
210 See id. at 856. 
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Intent to punish is not easily proved. For example, in Navegar, Inc. 
v. United States,211 a gun manufacturer alleged that a law showed the 
requisite legislative intent to punish based on a House Report that 
listed all of the semiautomatic weapons listed in the statute.212 Fur-
ther, the manufacturer pointed out that it was repeatedly named in 
the floor debates as a manufacturer of banned weapons.213 The Ninth 
Circuit, however, held that these allegations fell short of the type of 
evidence required to show punitive legislative intent.214 The court rea-
soned that any mention of the manufacturer's name was merely a re-
cital of the content of the Act, and found Congress showed no intent 
to punish.215 
Even a statement that singles out specific bad acts of a party (sug-
gesting that a legislator has found fault with that party's actions) is not 
sufficient to show punitive intent. For example, in BelLSouth ],216 re-
gional Bell operating companies were prevented from entering the 
information services market unless they complied with certain re-
quirements set forth in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.217 Bell-
South was able to only show a few scattered remarks referring to the 
anti-competitive abuses it allegedly committed in the past.218 This 
case demonstrates that even when the legislative history shows that 
there was discussion of a party's past misconduct, a corresponding 
punitive legislative intent is not necessarily inferred.219 
211 192 F.3d 1050, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
212 See id. at 1067. 
213 See id. 
214 See id. at 1068. 
215 See id. 
216 144 F.3d 58, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
217 See id. at 60-62. These requirements were imposed on joint ventures between elec-
tronic publishing companies and the regional telephone companies and included: main-
taining separate books and accounts forcing the companies to have separate employees, 
officers, and directors, and preventing the cO-Qwnership of property. See id. at 61-62. 
218 See id. at 67. 
219 See id. 
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D. Application Origin of the Modern Bill of Attainder Test 
1. Specificity, but No Punishment: Nixon v. Administrator of General 
Services 
147 
An individual must satisfy both the specificity and punishment 
prongs of the test to make a successful bill of attainder challenge.22o A 
classic example of a challenge that failed to satisfy both prongs is 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.221 In this case, former Presi-
dent Nixon challenged a law that gave the Administrator of General 
Services the power to seize and sort his presidential papers and tape 
recordings.222 President Nixon sued, alleging that the law was a bill of 
attainder that made it a legislative judgment of guilt and inflicted 
punishment on an identifiable individual, himself, without a judicial 
trial. 22!1 The specificity prong was satisfied in fact, because the law 
named President Nixon explicitly.224 The Supreme Court, however, 
found that the reference to President Nixon did not automatically 
offend the Clause.225 Instead, the Court held that the former Presi-
dent constituted a "legitimate class of one. "226 The statute could per-
missibly name President Nixon because his were the only presidential 
materials that required attention.227 While the Clause serves as a pro-
tection against the legislative deprivation of personal rights, Congress 
is not restricted "to the choice of legislating for the universe, or legis-
lating only benefits, or not legislating at all. "228 In other words, the 
Clause does prohibit the infliction of punishment on specifically 
named individuals but does not prohibit Congress from enacting leg-
islation that has incidental negative consequences.229 
President Nixon also failed to satisfy the punishment prong.2!10 
The Court found that the Clause prohibits legislative punishment, not 
burdensome consequences such as those imposed by the Act.231 Un-
220 See SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 154 F.3d 226, 
233 (5th Crr. 1998). 
221433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
222 See id. at 433-34. 
22~ See id. at 469. 
224 See id. at 471-72. 
225 See id. 
226 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. 
227 See id. 
228 See id. at 471. 
229 See id. 
230 See id. at 473-83. 
251 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472-73. 
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der the three-part punishment analysis, President Nixon did not suf-
fer any of the historically forbidden deprivations at the hands of Con-
gress.232 Rather, any contention that the law punitively confiscated 
President Nixon's property was countered by a provision in the law 
that permitted just compensation for any taking of personal prop-
erty.233 Second, since Congress stressed the need to preserve these 
presidential papers and the public's interest in these papers, the law 
had a clear, nonpunitive, legitimate purpose.234 Finally, neither the 
Committee reports nor the floor debates cast aspersions on President 
Nixon's behavior, nor did they condemn his behavior as deserving 
punishment.235 Instead, they only expressed the importance of the 
public interest, allowing the Court to conclude that there was no con-
gressional intent to punish President Nixon individually.236 
Nixon is especially instructive of the Court's analysis. It shows that 
even in the face of a law in which the language refers explicitly to one 
individual, and seems to inflict punishment in the face of an espe-
cially difficult national event, the law may not necessarily be an un-
constitutional bill of attainder, this is especially true if there is a 
significant public interest in the issue.237 
2. Recent Attacks on Legislation Using the Clause 
Nixon solidified the modern Court's approach to bills of attain-
der, clearly setting out the steps courts should take in analyzing legis-
lation alleged to violate the Clause.238 In recent years, there have been 
several attempts by various industries to attack legislation that has ei-
ther satisfied the specificity prong or imposed a legislative burden; all 
have failed to satisfy both elements of the bill of attainder test.239 Most 
notably, the telecommunications and weapons industries have at-
tacked legislation that significantly regulates the services and goods 
they provide.24o 
232 See id. at 475. 
233 See id. 
234 See id. at 477-78. 
235 See id. at 479. 
236 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479-8l. 
237 See generally id. at 471-72,473-83. 
238 See discussion supra Section lV.D .1. 
239 See e.g., Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999); BellSouth 
Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II). 
240 See e.g., Navegar, 192 F.3d 1050; BellSouth II, 162 F.3d 678. 
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In 1998, BellSouth Corporation, a regional Bell operating com-
pany, challenged the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in the District 
of Columbia Circuit.241 The appellant challenged a specific portion of 
the Act that prevented it from providing long distance telephone serv-
ice without first satisfying certain statutory criteria.242 Since the Act 
singled out the appellant by name, the court found that the specificity 
prong of the test was easily satisfied.24~ However, the punishment 
prong of the bill of attainder analysis required a more searching in-
quiry.244 
The D.C. Circuit held that a line-of-business restriction keeping 
the appellant from entering a particular area of the industry without. 
first satisfying certain requirements was not a traditional punishment 
under the test.245 Instead, the law's requirements were no different 
than the numerous regulatory measures aimed at other industries, 
which have not been held to inflict punishment.246 Rather than im-
posing a traditional employment bar prohibited by the Clause, the Act 
required only that the appellant open its local telephone markets to 
competition.247 
Not only were the requirements of the Act outside the definition 
of traditional punishment, but the Act had a clear, nonpunitive pur-
pose.248 The requirement imposed on the appellant was part of an act 
that was meant to provide a competitive telecommunications market 
in an area particularly susceptible to monopoly power.249 There was 
no punitive or suspicious motive in enacting the legislation.25o The 
legislative history and background of the Act was clear in this re-
gard.251 
Finally, even though members of Congress referred to the appel-
lant by name, the D.C. Circuit held that BellSouth was unable to meet 
the unmistakable punitive intent requirement set out by the Court in 
241 See Be/lSouth II, 162 F.3d at 680. 
242 See id. at 680-81. 
243 See id. at 684. 
244 See id. at 684-91. 
245 See id. at 685. 
246 See Be/lSouth II, 162 F.3d. at 685. 
247 See id. at 685. 
248 See id. at 688. 
249 See id. at 688-90. 
250 See id. at 690. 
251 See Be/lSouth II, 162 F.3d at 688-90. 
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Selective Service.252 All of these elements considered, the Act imposed 
no punishment on the appellant.253 
In 1999, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals heard 
an appeal by firearm manufacturers.254 The manufacturer challenged 
the federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, which 
made it unlawful to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic 
weapon.255 The D.C. Circuit chose not to address the issue of 
specificity, since the law named not only guns produced by the appel-
lant, but also copies and duplicates of those firearms.256 
The D.C. Circuit held that the law at issue did not impose a pun-
ishment on the manufacturer.257 Specifically, there was no historical 
punishment imposed: any analogy made between restricting the sale 
of semiautomatic weapons and the barring of specific parties from 
employment was unsupported.258 Bars to employment were initially 
held to be punishment because they singled out individuals as disloyal 
or disfavored.259 Here, the D.C. Circuit held that these weapons were 
singled out because they were dangerous and disproportionately 
linked to crime.260 Not only did the law fail to constitute a traditional 
punishment, but the court also held that there was a legitimate, non-
punitive purpose of reducing violent crimes connected with semiau-
tomatic weapons.261 In addition, while the appellant'S guns were men-
tioned in the House Report and in floor debates, the mention of the 
appellant's name did not suggest an intent to punish so much as it was 
a mere "recital of the content of the Act itself. "262 Thus, the Act lacked 
the punitive intent required to implicate the Clause.263 
While BellSouth II and Navegar dealt with the punishment aspect 
of the Clause, the specificity inquiry was addressed in a recent Illinois 
252 See id. at 690; Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 
U.S. 841, 856 n.15 (1984). 
253 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690. 
254 See Navegar, Inc. V. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also dis-
cussion of Fresno Rifle, supra Section IV.C.2.b., regarding a challenge made by the gun in-
dustry to a California statute similar to the federal statute at issue in Navegar. 
255 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1052. 
256 See id. at 1066 n.lO. 
257 See id. at 1066. 
258 See id. at 1066--67. 
259 See id. at 1066--67. 
260 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067. 
261 See id. 
262 See id. at 1068. 
263 See id. 
2000] Challenging the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 151 
case. In Cathy's Tap, Inc. v. Village of Mapleton,264 the town council en-
acted ordinances that prohibited nude dancing in conjunction with 
the sale ofliquor.265 At the time the ordinance was passed, the Maple-
ton Board acknowledged that there were currently only two liquor 
licenses in the town.266 The plaintiff, a local adult establishment that 
served alcohol, lost its liquor license as a result of the ordinance.267 
However, even though the plaintiff's establishment had one of only 
two licenses and was the only adult establishment in the village, the 
district court held that the ordinance did not rise to the level of 
specificity required to violate the Clause.26B Thus, while the ordinance 
applied only to one clearly identifiable business, it did not meet the 
initial threshold requirement for being a bill of attainder.269 
These examples of recent challenges based on the Clause are 
helpful to understand how the Nixon test for bills of attainder has 
evolved in the thirty-three years since its articulation. While the re-
quirements of specificity and punishment remain essentially the same, 
the inquiry into Congress's nonpunitive, legitimate legislative purpose 
is becoming much more important to upholding legislative actions 
and the specificity element seems to have been relaxed.27o 
V. DOES SECTION 5007 OF OPA CONSTITUTE A BILL OF ATTAINDER? 
SeaRiver Maritime has not yet appealed the Alaska District 
Court's July 1998 ruling that the terms of the 1991 consent decree 
constrain the company from challenging section 5007 as a bill of at-
tainder.271 If SeaRiver Maritime does decide to appeal this ruling to 
the Ninth Circuit, the corporation's claim could be heard at some 
time in the future. Thus, the merits of this claim deserve discussion, 
especially in light of the recent uses of the Clause in attacking various 
forms of legislation that inflict undesirable burdens on different in-
dustries.272 
264 65 F. Supp. 2d 874,881 (C.D. Ill. 1999). 
265 Id. at 878-79. 
266 Id. at 878. 
267Id. at 878-79. 
268 See id. at 881. 
269 See id. 
270 See id.; see also BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678, 
686-90. 
271 See discussion supra Section III.B. 
272 See generally BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 678 
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II); SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications 
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A. SPecificity 
As a threshold matter, a court will inquire whether Congress 
acted with specificity in enacting section 5007.27!l A law is constitution-
ally impermissible if it singles out specific individuals or businesses, a 
group, or readily ascertainable members of a group.274 As noted in 
Broum, a law does not have to name the group or individual explicitly, 
but can violate the Clause merely by describing certain people 
specifically.275 Even if a law refers to an individual by name, however, 
the Clause is not automatically ofIended.276 For example, in Nixon, the 
Court held that former President Nixon constituted a legitimate class 
of one because his were the only materials that demanded immediate 
attention.277 As a result, it was permissible for Congress to pass a law 
that applied to him alone.278 
Cathy's Tap dealt with a similar situation.279 Even though the 
Mapleton Board acknowledged that there were currently only two liq-
uor licenses in the town, and the plaintiff lost its liquor license as a 
result of the ordinance, the district court held that the ordinance did 
not rise to the level of specificity required to violate the Clause.28o 
Similar to the Supreme Court's holding in Nixon, the threshold 
specificity requirement for bills of attainder was still not satisfied even 
though the local ordinance in Cathy's Tap applied only to one clearly 
iden tifiable business.281 
In theory, section 5007 could be perceived as specifically directed 
at the Valdez spill. The statute applies to spills occurring after March 
22, 1989, the day before the actual Exxon Valdez spill, effectivelyallow-
ing the statute to apply to the SeaRiver Mediterranean.282 Further, the 
law applies to any vessel that has spilled more than one million gal-
lons of oil into the marine environment, a class into which only the 
SeaRiver Mediterranean falls since the vessel spilled eleven million gal-
Comm'n, 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998); Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 
F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1992). 
273 See SBC Communications, 154 F.3d at 233. 
274 See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946; Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 
192 F.3d 1050, 1065 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
275 See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,442 (1965). 
276 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 433, 471-72 (1977). 
277 See id. at 472. 
278 Seeid. 
279 65 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (C.D. Ill. 1999). 
286 See id. at 878--81. 
281 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72; Cathy's Tap, 65 F. Supp. 2d at 881. 
282 See 33 U.S.C. § 2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
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Ions of oil into Prince William Sound.283 However, despite what seem 
to be sufficient instances of specificity, there is little chance that a 
court will find section 5007 to be a bill of attainder. 284 
Rather, given the circumstances leading up to the enactment of 
OPA,285 it is clear that section 5007 applies to any vessel that spills one 
million gallons of oil into the marine environment after March 22, 
1989.286 That is, other vessels may later be barred from Prince William 
Sound if they also spill an excess of the amount prescribed in the 
statute.287 At some point in the future, another vessel could potentially 
spill more than one million gallons of oil such that it will also be 
barred from Prince William Sound. However, section 5007 presently 
applies to only one vessel,288 so that the SeaRiver Mediterranean is "a 
legitimate class of one."289 Therefore, section 5007 fails to implicate 
the Clause because it is a generally applicable rule that applies to all 
tanker vessels that spill the specified amount of oil. 290 
Further, section 5007, like the statute at issue in Nixon, does not 
rise to the level of specificity required under the Clause.291 There, the 
Court was unwilling to find a bill of attainder even where legislation 
singled out former President Nixon by name.292 At most, section 5007 
creates an inference that it prevents only the SeaRiver Mediterranean 
from returning to Prince William Sound, when it is in fact prohibiting 
any vessel that spills a specified amount of oil after a certain date from 
283 See id. 
284 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72. 
285 Specifically, the Exxon Valdez spill, the three spills in the Houston Ship Channel, 
Delaware River, and Narragansett Bay in June 1989, the spill in California, and Congress's 
fifteen-year attempt to enact oil pollution legislation, could be defined, in totality, as the 
instances leading to the passing of OPA. See discussion supra Section I. 
286 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472; Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 
723, 728 (9th Cir. 1992). 
287 See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728. 
288 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 457 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). 
289 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. 
290 But see United Statesv. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 450 (1965). In Brown, the law at issue 
implicated the Clause because it failed to set out a generally applicable rule that was ap-
plied to all persons, Communist or not, who were likely to initiate political strikes, which 
was the alleged evil Congress sought to remedy. See id. But see Cathy's Tap, Inc. v. Village of 
Mapleton, 665 F. Supp. 2d 874, 881 (C.D. Ill. 1999). Section 5007 is intrinsically different, 
as it applies to any vessel that spills a certain amount of oil after a certain date, thus having 
a direct connection to the purpose of the statute, which was to drastically change the pre-
vention and cleanup of oil spills. See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2737 (1994 & Supp. III 
1997) and discussion supra Section II.B. 
291 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471-72. 
292 See id. 
154 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28: 119 
reentering the Sound.29!1 Thus, section 5007 "casts a wider net" by 
leaving room for other vessels to fall within the statutory prohibi-
tion.294 An otherwise valid law such as section 5007 is not transformed 
into a bill of attainder merely because it regulates conduct on the part 
of a designated class of individuals.295 While the Clause serves an im-
portant function in confining the legislature to rulemaking, it "does 
not ... limit [C]ongress to the choice of legislating for the universe, 
or legislating only benefits, or not legislating at all."296 Under this 
analysis, SeaRiver Maritime's reputed assertion that it is protected 
from any legislation that imposes a burden upon the corporation is 
unfounded.297 
Thus, section 5007 does not meet the threshold level of 
specificity required to implicate the Clause.298 However, even if legisla-
tive specification is shown, a court must also find that section 5007 
imposes a burden that could be deemed punishment under the 
Clause.299 
B. Punishment 
Once a court determines that a law is directed at a specified indi-
vidual, it will then inquire whether the legislative action imposes a 
punishment.30o Both the specificity and punishment elements must be 
satisfied in order for a court to find that legislation is a bill of attain-
der.301 Whether a law constitutes punishment is a three-part inquiry, 
analyzing whether the legislation imposes a traditional punishment, 
295 See 33 U.S.C. § 2737. 
294 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 472. Further, in Navegar, the Violent Crime Control and Law En-
forcement Act, which regulated assault weapons, was held not to be a bill of attainder. See 
192 F.3d at 1068. There, the court held that the specificity prohibition of the Clause was 
not implicated because it named not only the guns made by the plaintiffs, but also 14 
other firearms and three broad categories of pistols, rifles, and shotguns. See id. at 1066 
n.l0. The court held that this was evidence that Congress was not singling out the plain-
tiffs, but aiming to prohibit an entire class of weapons. See id. 
295 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 470-71; Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 
723, 727 (9th Cir. 1992). 
296 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 471. 
297 See id. 
298 See id.; Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 727. 
199 SeeSBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 154 F.3d 226, 
233 (5th Cir. 1998). 
300 See id. 
301 See id. at 234. 
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whether it has some other nonpunitive function, and whether the mo-
tivation of the legislature was to punish the specified individual. 302 
1. Traditional Punishment Test 
A law will be an unconstitutional bill of attainder if it imposes a 
punishment traditionally prohibited by the Clause.303 SeaRiver Mari-
time alleges that it is a punishment for the SeaRiver Mediterranean to be 
permanently barred from entering Prince William Sound because the 
vessel was built specifically for the California-Alaska route.304 Thus, 
section 5007 prevents the vessel from operating in the place for which 
it was constructed.305 While SeaRiver Maritime would like a court to 
believe that this incidental consequence falls within the traditional 
test for punishment, the connection between the effect of the statute 
and traditional punishment is tenuous.306 
The SeaRiver Mediterranean currently operates in the Mediterra-
nean Sea.307 SeaRiver Maritime alleges that it is much less profitable 
to operate the tanker in Europe than it would be if it were permitted 
to operate the vessel in Alaska.308 Barring the SeaRiver Mediterranean 
from Prince William Sound, however, does not fit within the tradi-
tional punishments of the Clause,309 which typically include: impris-
onment, banishment, punitive confiscation of property, and prohibi-
tion of designated individuals or groups from participation in a 
specified employment or vocation.310 In Fresno Rifle, gun manufactur-
ers and shooting clubs claimed that a law that identified the weapons 
they manufactured as "assault weapons" was a bill of attainder.311 
However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that this was not an impermis-
sible punishment traditionally prohibited by the Clause.312 Instead, 
302 See Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 
(1984); Nixon, 433 U.S. at 473,475-78; discussion infra Section IV.C.2. 
303 See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 474-75; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 152, at 685. 
304 See SeaRiver Maritime Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Pena, 952 F. Supp. 455, 457 (S.D. Tex. 
1996) (SeaRiver I). 
305 See id. 
306 Cf United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 458-60 (1965). 
307 See Martin, supra note 17, at AI. 
308 See Goldberg, supra note 23, at AI. 
309 See Fresno Rifle and Pistol Club v. Van De Kamp, 965 F.2d 723, 727-28 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
310 See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 473, 474 (1977); Fresno Rifle, 965 
F.2d at 728. 
m See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 724-25. 
312 See id. at 728; see also Nixon, 433 U.S. at 477-78. 
156 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 28:119 
the court held that the law at issue was merely indirect economic pun-
ishment and failed to amount to punitive confiscation.313 
The same thing can be said of the SeaRiver Mediterranean. As in 
Fresno Rifle, the critical question is whether the kind of "economic 
punishment" inflicted on the corporation is the sort prohibited by the 
Constitution.314 A court would surely conclude that barring the vessel 
from Prince William Sound is not such a punishment.315 The corpora-
tion is free to continue operating the SeaRiver Mediterranean in other 
venues besides Prince William Sound and has done so since the ves-
sel's $30 million overhaul in 1990.316 Further, the corporation has 
other vessels operating both in Prince William Sound and in other 
parts of the world.317 While the corporation may be experiencing 
some cognizable economic consequences, they are indirect and in no 
way amount to punitive confiscation.318 
Further, line-of-business restrictions on corporations have been 
held to pose no bill of attainder concerns.319 For example, in BellSouth 
II, a statute required local operating companies to open their local 
telephone markets to competition to avoid the creation of monopo-
lies.32o The local operating companies argued that this restriction on 
their business operations was analogous to the employment bars held 
by the Supreme Court to be bills of attainder.321 The court found no 
bill of attainder concerns even though the law violated the specificity 
prong of the test.322 The SeaRiver Mediterranean finds itself in a similar 
situation: just as the local telephone companies are barred from en-
tering certain markets until they fulfill the specified requirements, the 
vessel is barred from Prince William Sound because it meets a specific 
legislative requirement.323 
Since the two situations are factually analogous, SeaRiver Mari-
time's challenge to OPA will most likely receive the same treatment by 
a court. As in Bel/South II, there is a very loose and unsupported anal-
313 Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728. 
314 See id. 
315 See id. 
316 See Sedendo, supra note 97, at 3. 
317 See For Now, at Least, Infamous Ship is Banished from Alaska, supra note 18, at 5. 
318 See Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728. 
319 See BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 686, 686 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998) (BellSouth II); BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 144 F.3d 
58,64-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BellSouth l). 
320 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 685. 
321 See id. 
322 See id. at 684-86. 
323 See id. 
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ogy between the traditional employment disbarments forbidden by 
the Clause and section 5007 ofOPA.324 
Placing section 5007 among the burdens historically forbidden as 
attainder seems especially dubious because the statute does not bar 
the SeaRiver Mediterranean from operating ever again, but simply from 
reentering Prince William Sound.325 SeaRiver Maritime is free to con-
tinue operating the vessel in the Middle East or, if the corporation so 
chooses, in any other waters of the United States.326 
2. Functional Test 
A court must also ensure that the "nonpunitive aims of an appar-
ently prophylactic measure are sufficiently clear and convincing" be-
fore finding that a law does not constitute a bill of attainder.327 More 
specifically, if there is an adequate nexus between the restriction im-
posed and some legitimate, nonpunitive governmental purpose, a law 
will not offend the Clause.328 
While section 5007 could be said to place a burden on SeaRiver 
Maritime, a burdensome regulation cannot always be equated with 
punishment. 329 The purpose of section 5007 is not to punish the cur-
rent owners of the vesse1.330 Instead, section 5007 is an attempt to de-
vise a much-needed scheme of protection and prevention to ensure 
that Prince William Sound is never again faced with the type of crisis 
created by the Exxon Valdez oil Spill.331 
This contention is supported by two important considerations. 
First, SeaRiver Maritime's claim of punitive purpose is somewhat un-
dermined by section 5007's placement in a law that generally notes its 
attempts to change the way the United States deals with oil pollu-
tion.332 On the whole, the legislative aim in enacting OPA was to dra-
matically change the schemes in place for liability, prevention, and 
324 See BellSouth IL 162 F.3d at 686; BellSouth L 144 F.3d at 64-65. 
325 See BellSouth L 144 F.3d at 65. 
326 See id. 
327 BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 686 (quoting mBE, supra note 185, at 655). 
328 See BellSouth IL 162 F.3d at 688; Dehainaut v. Pen a, 32 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th Cir. 
1994). 
329 See DeVeau V. Braisted, 363 U.S. 194, 160 (1960); Navegar, Inc. V. United States, 192 
F.3d 1050, 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
330 SeeDeVeau, 363 U.S. at 160; Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067. 
331 SeeNavegar, 192 F.3d at 1067. 
332 See Navegar, 192 F.3d at 1067; Fresno Rifle, 965 F.2d at 728. 
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cleanup of oil spills.333 Furthermore, section 5007 is placed in a por-
tion of the Act that specifically aims to remedy the consequences of 
the worst oil spill in the United States' history by implementing 
specific preventive measures for Prince William Sound, such as the 
Bligh Reef light334 and an improved tanker-traffic navigation system.335 
When placed in the context of OPA generally and the Prince William 
Sound provisions specifically, it becomes clear that section 5007 is not 
a punitive, but rather a protective measure.336 
Second, the consequences of the Exxon Valdez spill were serious 
and have had lasting effects for both the environment and the people 
of Prince William Sound.337 It is entirely conceivable that Congress 
perceived that vessels with a history of serious oil spills pose a consid-
erable risk of aggravating the already drastic conditions in Prince Wil-
liam Sound, and should thus be barred from the Sound to prevent 
that risk from being realized.338 Except in the most dire of circum-
stances,339 a spill of the Exxon Valdez's magnitude would indicate care-
lessness on the part of the oil industry.340 That is, the Exxon Valdez spill 
resulted not from just one mistake, but from a series of bad decisions 
and habits.341 Congress could have reasonably believed that it was too 
much of a risk to subject Prince William Sound to the chance that the 
SeaRiver Mediterranean, or any other vessel that creates a massive spill, 
could spill again.342 Mter all, if industry carelessness led to the dis-
333 See generally 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2737 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2)-
(3) (1994) (providing for the suspension of crew members' licenses for alcohol or drug 
abuse). 
334 See id. § 2733. 
335 See id. § 2734. 
336 See id. §§ 2701-2737; 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2)-(3) (providing for the suspension of crew 
members' licenses for alcohol or drug abuse). 
337 See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text. 
338 See BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 162 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998); Randle, supra note 3, at 10,120. 
339 Such circumstances are implicitly recognized in OPA, which provides three de-
fenses to liability: an act of God, an act of war, or an act or omission of a third party. See 33 
U.S.C. § 2703. 
340 See Schneider, supra note 30, at 1. Schneider notes that the Exxon Valdez spill was the 
direct result of a series of mistakes on the part of Exxon and the industry consortium that 
owns the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See id. 
341 See supra Section I. 
342 See BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 689; see also Dehainaut v. Pena, 32 F.3d 1066, 1072 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (holding that restricting striking air traffic controllers from returning to work 
was done to prevent intermingling between those fired and those they were replaced with 
to avoid interference in safety and efficiency of FAA operations, not to punish the control-
lers); Schellong v. United States Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 805 F.2d 655, 662 
(7th Cir. 1986) (holding that statutory provision that allowed participants in Nazi persecu-
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charge of eleven million gallons, industry carelessness could also lead 
to the same pattern of bad decision making and result in the same 
vessel spilling again. Read against the background of the events in 
1989 and 1990, there is little chance that anyone could suggest that 
the risk of another major oil spill was so feeble that section 5007's bar 
was a smoke screen for some invidious purpose.343 Rather, protecting 
against the risk of future spills is a legitimate and non punitive pur-
pose, and thus fulfills the second aspect of the punishment test.344 
3. Congress's Motivation in Enacting Section 5007 
The final step in the test of punishment requires a court to de-
termine whether the legislative record evinces an intent to punish.345 
Congress's motivation in enacting section 5007 of OPA can be de-
scribed as nothing other than preventive.346 If a legislative action is to 
be found a bill of attainder, there must be an unmistakable legislative 
intent to punish the specified individual.347 Isolated statements about 
a particular individual or those that express distaste for a particular 
behavior are not sufficient to show punitive intent.348 
While the legislative history discusses the Exxon Valdez accident, 
acknowledges it as the largest spill in United States history, and cites 
its significant impact on the commercial and environmental interests 
in Prince William Sound, there is no evidence of any punitive in-
tent.349 The mention of the Exxon Valdez accident and its conse-
quences in the congressional reports does not suggest the intent to 
punish but rather was a recital of the immediate events leading up to 
the enactment of OPA.350 Further, the legislative history also alludes 
to the other oil spills in 1989 and 1990 that were a cause of concern 
for both Congress and the Nation. 351 
tion to be deported was to ensure that the U.S. not become a haven for individuals who 
were involved with brutal persecution and murder of millions of people, not to punish the 
participants) . 
343 See BelLSouth II, 162 F.3d at 689. 
M4 SeeDehainaut, 32 F.3d at 1072; Schellong v. United States Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 805 F.2d 655, 662 (7th Cir. 1986). 
34S See Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478 (1977). 
M6 See, e.g., H.R CONF. REp. No. 101-653, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 
722,838; S. REp. No. 101-99, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 722, 776. 
347 See Selective Servo Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group., 468 U.S. 841, 
856n.15 (1984). 
348 See id. 
349 SeeS. REp. No. 101-99, at 1-2, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 722, 750-51. 
350 SeeNavegar, Inc. v. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
551 See discussion supra Section I. 
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As discussed in Selective Service, even statements by Congressmen 
that expressed indignation at the decision of individuals not to regis-
ter in the draft did not constitute a punitive legislative intent.352 
Rather, these isolated statements lacked the punitive purpose re-
quired to strike a law as a bill of attainder.353 In the same manner, ref-
erences to the spill by the SeaRiver Mediterranean's previous owner and 
Exxon's responsibility for that spill do not provide the kind of '''smok-
ing gun' evidence of congressional vindictiveness" required to estab-
lish that section 5007 is a bill of attainder.354 Instead, section 5007 is 
best classified as a measure intended to protect Prince William Sound 
from any further environmental damage.355 
Part of the difficulty lies in that there is no discussion of section 
5007 in the legislative history.356 Alaska Senator Ted Stevens inserted 
section 5007 into the Conference Report.357 However, the Conference 
Report's failure to discuss section 5007 does not automatically impli-
cate the statute as a bill of attainder.358 Rather, it suggests just the op-
posite and bolsters the claim that it is not a bill of attainder because 
there is no explicit attempt to punish.359 In addition, reading section 
5007 in the context of OPA, which is not one of punishment, but one 
of prevention and improvement on the statutory scheme that existed 
in 1990, could cure the lack oflegislative history.36o 
CONCLUSION 
When SeaRiver Maritime's possible claims are put through this 
analysis, it is clear that it will not satisfy the criteria for bills of attain-
der. Not only does section 5007 lack the specificity required to violate 
the Clause, but it also fails to impose a punishment. The specificity 
element is not met because section 5007 applies not only to the 
352 See Selective Serv., 468 U.S. at 856 n.15. 
353 See id. 
354 BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 144 F.3d 58 67 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (BelLSouth 1); see also BellSouth Corp. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 162 F.3d 
678,690 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (BelLSouth 11); SBC Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communica-
tions Comm'n, 154 F.3d 226, 243 (5th Cir. 1998). 
355 See BelLSouth I, 144 F.3d at 67; see also BelLSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690; SBC Communica-
tions, 154 F.3d at 243. 
356 See, e.g., H.R. CONF. REp. No. 101-653, at 159 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
722,838; S. REp. No. 101-99, at 33 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 776. 
357 See Richards, supra note 90, at Bl. 
358 See Nixon v. Administator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 478-79 (1977). 
359 See Selective Servo Sys. V. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 
855-56 (1984). 
360 See Navegar, Inc. V. United States, 192 F.3d 1050, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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SeaRiver Mediterranean, but also to any vessel that may spill the 
specified amount of oil in the future. In addition, section 5007 does 
not implicate a punishment element. Banning a vessel from a specific 
geographic region is not the sort of traditional punishment forbidden 
by the Clause. Also, there is a serious and legitimate nonpunitive pur-
pose in preventing any vessel that has spilled a significant amount of 
oil from endangering a region that has already suffered serious envi-
ronmental and economic damage from the worst oil spill in u.s. his-
tory. Further, the legislative record evinces no intent to punish either 
the vessel or Exxon, the owner of the vessel at the time OPA became 
law. Given all of these factors, a court would probably not consider 
section 5007 of OPA to be a bill of attainder. Thus, section 5007 
should stand, and any vessel that spills one million gallons of oil into 
the marine environment, including the SeaRiver Mediterranean, should 
not be permitted to have access to Prince William Sound. 

